United States v. Starrett City Associates, 840 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1988) by Nooney, Kathleen L.
Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law
Volume 36 Housing Symposium
January 1989
United States v. Starrett City Associates, 840 F.2d
1096 (2d Cir. 1988)
Kathleen L. Nooney
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship.
For more information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kathleen L. Nooney, United States v. Starrett City Associates, 840 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1988), 36 Wash. U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 279
(1989)
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol36/iss1/15
UNITED STATES v. STARRETT CITY
ASSOCIATES,
840 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1988)
Congress enacted the Fair Housing Act of 19681 to promote nondis-
criminatory housing transactions2 and to attain and preserve integrated
housing.3 These dual goals conflict, however, when low-income hous-
ing attracts large numbers of minorities. Theoretically, an influx of
blacks "tips" 4 the racial balance of the area and causes whites to move
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1982).
2. Senator Mondale, the original sponsor of the fair housing amendments, stated,
"We do not see any good reason or justification, in the first place, for permitting dis-
crimination in the sale or rental of housing." 114 CONG. REc. 5642 (1968). Mondale
noted that Title VIII "removes the opportunity to insult and discriminate against a
fellow American because of his color." Id. at 5643. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3603-06 (1982)
(outlawing discrimination in the sale, rental, or financing of most housing). See gener-
ally Note, Discrimination in Employment and Housing: Private Enforcement Provisions
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 1968, 82 HARV. L. REv. 834 (1969); Comment, The
Federal Fair Housing Requirements: Title VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights Act, 1969 DUKE
LJ. 733.
3. Senator Mondale also noted, "The rapid, block-by-block expansion of the ghetto
will be slowed and replaced by truly integrated and balanced living patterns." 114
CONG. REc. 3422 (1968). In Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins., 409 U.S. 205 (1972),
the Supreme Court unanimously held that white tenants had standing under Title VIII
to sue a landlord for discrimination against nonwhites. The court reasoned that the
landlord had deprived the tenants of the benefits of a racially integrated community.
See also Comment, HUD Has Affirmative Duty to Consider Low Income Housing's Im-
pact Upon Racial Concentration, 85 HARV. L. REv. 870 (1972).
4. "The premise of tipping is that when black residency in a neighborhood reaches a
certain level ... white homeowners and renters will rapidly abandon the area because
their 'tolerance for interracial living' will have been exceeded." Goering, Neighborhood
Tipping and Racial Transition: A Review of Social Evidence, 44 AM. INsT. OF PLAN-
NERS J. 68 (1978); see also Ackerman, Integration for Subsidized Housing and the Ques-
tion of Racial Occupancy Controls, 26 STAN. L. RaV. 245, 251-60 (1974) (setting the
tipping factor somewhere between 30% and 50%). The tipping point was a major con-
cern in Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 304 F. Supp. 736, 739-40 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
For a detailed discussion of the tipping point, see Navasky, The Benevolent Housing
Quota, How. L.J. 30 (1960); Note, Economic Tipping: An Approach to a Balanced
Neighborhood, 4 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 167 (1975).
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out.5 Consequently, to maintain racial integration in low-income com-
munities, housing administrators impose race-conscious rental quotas6
that restrict minority access to housing. Thus, by satisfying the Act's
integration goals, housing administrators frustrate the Act's antidis-
crimination policy. In United States v. Starrett City Association,7 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that under
the Fair Housing Act landlords may not use rigid racial quotas of an
indefinite duration to maintain a fixed level of integration in low-in-
come communities.8
In Starrett City, the owners of a housing development 9 adopted a
race-conscious tenant selection procedure.10 The United States Attor-
5. National surveys show that "white flight" occurs when whites begin to fear racial
turnover. Ackerman, supra note 4, at 253.
6. Racial occupancy quotas stabilize racially mixed populations by persuading
neighbors that the low-income housing complex will not inundate their neighborhood
and its schools with minority families. Ackerman, supra note 4, at 246.
7. 840 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1988). The defendants were Starrett City Associates,
Starrett City, Inc., and Delmar Management Company. The defendants constructed,
owned, and operated Starrett City, the largest housing development in the nation. Id. at
1097-98.
8. Id at 1103. The court concluded Starrett violated various provisions of the Fair
Housing Act. Starrett's denial of apartments to blacks solely because of race violated 42
U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1968). By forcing black applicants to wait significantly longer for
apartments than whites solely because of race, the defendants violated 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604(b). A policy that preferred white applicants and limited the acceptance of mi-
nority applicants violated 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c). Finally, Starrett violated 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604(d) by misrepresenting in acknowledgment letters that apartments were not avail-
able for rent. Starrett City, 840 F.2d at 1099.
9. Starrett City consists of 46 high-rise buildings containing 5,881 apartments in
Brooklyn, New York. At the time of appeal, Starrett had made capital contributions of
$19,091,000 to the project, the New York State Housing Finance Agency had made
$362,720,000 in mortgage loans, and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment was subsidizing Starrett's monthly Mortgage payments. Id. at 1098.
The United States Housing Foundation had originally proposed a development of
cooperative apartments at the Starrett City site. When the Housing Project abandoned
its proposed development, Starrett proposed to construct the rental units on the condi-
tion that the New York City Board of Estimate approve a transfer to Starrett of the city
real estate tax abatement granted to the original project. Then, when the surrounding
community expressed its fear that subsidized housing would create an overwhelmingly
minority community, Starrett City developers assured them that they intended to create
a racially integrated community. Id.
10. Pursuant to Starrett's tenant selection procedure, applicants completed informa-
tion cards stating, among other things, race or national origin, family composition, in-
come, and employment. As vacancies arose, management filled the vacancies with




ney General brought suit against the owners,"1 claiming that reserving
apartments for whites was a clear violation of the Fair Housing Act.2
The owners maintained that racial quotas were necessary to prevent
the loss of white tenants. The owners claimed that without quotas the
complex would be occupied predominantly by minorities. 3 Further-
more, the owners maintained that the absence of quotas would have a
tipping effect on the entire community, ultimately causing "white
flight" and ghettoization of the integrated areas.14 The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted summary
judgment for the government, 5 enjoined the owners from discriminat-
ing against applicants on the basis of race, and required the owners to
adopt objective tenant selection procedures subject to the court's ap-
proval. 6 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed, 7 holding that the Fair Housing Act precludes landlords from
11. The government brought suit to resolve an issue joined, but left unresolved, in
Arthur v. Starrett City Assocs., 89 F.D.R. 542 (E.D.N.Y. 1985). In Arthur, a group of
black applicants brought a class action alleging that Starrett's tenanting procedures
were racially discriminatory. In a settlement agreement Starrett made an additional 35
units available each year for a five-year period to black and minority applicants. The
court entered a consent decree. Starrett City, 840 F.2d at 1098-99.
12. United States v. Starrett City Assocs., 605 F. Supp. 262, 262-63 (1985). The
government maintained that Starrett's tenanting procedures violated 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3604(a)-(d) (1982).
13. Starrett City, 840 F.2d at 1098. Starrett claimed that from the beginning it had
difficulty attracting an integrated applicant pool despite extensive advertising and pro-
motional efforts. Id. at 1098. Starrett "sought to maintain a racial distribution by
apartment of 64% white, 22% black and 8% Hispanic." United States v. Starrett City
Assocs., 660 F. Supp. 668, 671 (E.D.N.Y. 1987). This policy created relatively stable
percentages of whites and minorities living at Starrett City between 1975 and 1988. Id.
at 672.
14. 840 F.2d at 1098. See supra notes 4-6 for a discussion of white flight and
tipping.
15. 660 F. Supp. at 678-79. Starrett moved to dismiss on the grounds that judicial
estoppel barred the action because the government had refused to intervene in the Ar-
thur suit. See supra note 11 for discussion of Arthur. Upon denial of the motion, both
parties moved for summary judgment. Starrett did not dispute the alleged violations of
the Fair Housing Act; instead, Starrett sought to justify the challenged actions. Id.
Contending that its tenanting procedures were adopted only to maintain and achieve
integration, Starrett sought to justify its challenged actions with the testimony of three
housing experts who estimated Starrett City's particular "tipping" point. 840 F.2d at
1099.
16. Id. at 1100. The court retained jurisdiction over the parties for three years. Id.
17. Id. at 1099. The Second Circuit found that if landlords imposed racial quotas,
apartment opportunities for blacks and Hispanics were diminished, while opportunities
for whites were enhanced. Id.
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using rigid racial quotas of indefinite duration to maintain a fixed level
of integration in low-income communities. 8
Congress enacted the Fair Housing Act of 1968 to foster integrated
living patterns and to promote freedom of choice in housing.19 How-
ever, because Congress perceived integration and antidiscrimination as
complementary goals, 20 neither the language2' nor the legislative his-
tory2 2 of the Act addresses the statutory validity of race-conscious inte-
gration quotas.
Historically, courts have held that no government interest justifies
racial classifications.23 However, with the advent of affirmative action
and "benign" quotas,24 courts recognized that some race-conscious
18. Id. at 1103.
19. See supra note 3 (discussing Congress' intent to achieve integrated housing by
breaking up residential concentrations of minorities); see supra note 2 (discussing Con-
gress' intent to achieve freedom of choice in housing by prohibiting discriminatory
housing practices).
20. Congress enacted Title VIII under the assumption that strict adherence to the
antidiscrimination provisions would effectuate integration. Rubinowitz & Trossman,
Affirmative Action and the American Dream: Implementing Fair Housing Policies in
Federal Homeownership Programs, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 491, 538 n.178 (1979) ("Senator
Mondale's comments indicate that integrated living patterns were the expected outcome
of fair housing provisions protecting individual choice.").
21. Section 3601 of the Fair Housing Act provides: "It is the policy of the United
States to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the
United States." 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1982). Section 3604 explicitly prohibits discrimina-
tion in the sale or rental of most housing. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1982). Without suggesting
any particular method, § 3608(d)(5) gives the Secretary of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment the authority to "administer the programs and activities relating to housing and
urban development in a manner affirmatively to further the policies of this title." 42
U.S.C. § 3608(d)(5) (1982).
22. The Fair Housing Act was the product of a truncated legislative process. Be-
cause legislators offered it as a floor amendment in the Senate, neither the House nor the
Senate issued a committee report. Thus, legislative history is scarce. Starrett City, 840
F.2d at 1106 n.3 (Newman, J., dissenting). Congress probably did not debate the ad-
ministration of racial quotas because "most of those who passed this statute in 1968
probably could not even contemplate a private real estate owner who would deliberately
set out to achieve a racially balanced tenant population." Id. at 1106. See also Acker-
man, supra note 4, at 304.
23. Burney v. Housing Auth. of the County of Beaver, 551 F. Supp. 746, 756 (W.D.
Pa. 1982). The Supreme Court did allow racial classifications in the now famous Japa-
nese imprisonment cases during World War II. See Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayshi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
24. Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World - The Problem of Special Treat-
ment, 61 Nw. U. L. REv. 363, 389 (1966) ("In common speech the benign quota is an
upper limit on something desirable - we do not speak of benign quotas of the number
of Negroes in slums but rather of the number in desirable housing.").
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plans are valid.25 Thus, courts have permitted limited use of racial
classifications pursuant to federal statutes enacted to prohibit segrega-
tion and discrimination in employment, education, and housing.26
Specifically, courts have permitted race-conscious plans if they remedy
a history of prior discrimination,27 are temporary,28 and do not totally
preclude members of a protected class from obtaining the opportunity
they seek.29
A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case under the Fair Housing Act
by showing that the challenged action has a racially discriminatory ef-
fect.3 ° The defendant must justify the acts that caused the discrimina-
25. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166 (1987); United Steelwork-
ers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979).
26. Affirmative action plans have been upheld against challenges brought under Ti-
tles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and under the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment.
27. See, eg., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (school board's
policy of extending preferential protection against layoffs to some employees because of
their race, absent a showing of prior discrimination, violates fourteenth amendment);
Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 448 (1986).
28. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency of Santa Clara County, 480 U.S.
616 (1987) (express assurance that an employment program is temporary may be neces-
sary if the program actually sets aside positions according to specific numbers); United
States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166 (1987) (upholding the Department of Public
Safety's requirement that blacks receive 50% of promotions until black troopers com-
pose 25% of ranks); Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986) (temporary
affirmative action plan upheld as an appropriate remedy to Title VII violation); Fulli-
love v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 489 (1980) (minority business enterprise provision of
Public Works Employment Act of 1977 held valid because it limited in extent and dura-
tion the use of racial and ethnic criteria); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,
208 (1979) (affirmative action plan reserving for blacks 50% of the openings in a crafts
training program until the percentage of blacks in plant equaled the percentage of
blacks in local labor force did not violate Title VII); Banks v. Perk, 341 F. Supp. 1175,
1184 (E.D. Ohio 1972) (public housing plan that dispersed housing by placing it in one
low-income area until the tipping point was approached held valid).
29. See, eg., Parent Assoc. of Andrew Jackson School v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 709 (2d
Cir. 1975) (fifty percent maximum quota on the number of black students attending any
former white school permissible since no black person was totally denied a government
benefit); Johnson v. Board of Educ. of Chicago, 457 U.S. 52 (1982) (separate quotas set
for black and white enrollment at two schools permissible because all children received
the benefit of a government education); but cf Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265 (1978) (medical school's admission plan reserving 16% of openings for minori-
ties held unconstitutional because it may have completely deprived some white students
of a medical education).
30. Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 148 (3d Cir. 1977) (plaintiff need
not show that the defendant acted with racially discriminatory motivation). Several
circuit courts agree with the holding in Rizzo. See, e.g., Metropolitan Hous..Dev. Corp.
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tory effects.31 The defendant must show that no alternative course of
action would achieve the interest with a less discriminatory impact.3 2
Five years after Congress enacted the Fair Housing Act, the Second
Circuit assessed the use of racial occupancy controls to maintain inte-
gration in low-income communities. In Otero v. New York City Hous-
ing Authority,33 former site occupants filed suit against the Housing
Authority under the Fair Housing Act, alleging racial discrimina-
tion.34 The Housing Authority maintained that its selective housing
practices were necessary because the racial balance of the community
was approaching the tipping point.35 The Second Circuit agreed, hold-
ing that the Housing Authority's affirmative obligation to foster racial
integration under the Fair Housing Act was paramount, even though
this meant the immediate denial of housing to minorities.3 6 The court
noted, however, that it would allow racial classifications to promote
integration only if racial segregation was imminent.37
Similarly, in Burney v. Housing Authority of County of Beaver,38
black applicants who were awaiting placement in low-income housing
filed a class action challenging the validity of the Housing Authority's
race-conscious tenant selection procedure. As its compelling justifica-
v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1287-90 (7th Cir. 1977); Smith v.
Anchor Bldg. Corp., 536 F.2d 231, 233 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. City of Black
Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1183 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1043 (1975); Kennedy
Park Homes Assoc., Inc. v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108, 114 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971). See also Comment, Applying the Title VII Prima Facie
Case to Title VII Litigation, 11 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 128 (1976).
31. Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 148.
32. Id. at 149.
33. 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973).
34. Id. at 1126. The Housing Authority denied the plaintiffs occupancy in public
housing built on the site. By committing most apartments to white renters, the Housing
Authority disregarded its own regulation and prior representations to the plaintiffs that
they would have first priority for housing at the new site. Id.
35. See supra note 4 for an explanation of "tipping."
36. Otero, 484 F.2d at 1140. The Second Circuit reversed the district court's deci-
sion that affirmative action to achieve racially balanced communities was impermissible
if it deprived minorities of scarce public housing. Otero v. New York City Hous. Auth.,
354 F. Supp. 941, 943 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
37. 484 F.2d at 1136. The court said absent convincing evidence that racial segre-
gation would occur if racial classifications were not imposed, "the Authority's denial of
housing to a family because of its race could ... constitute a form of unlawful racial
discrimination." Therefore, the Authority's burden of proving eventual "ghettoization"
was a heavy one. Id.
38. 551 F. Supp. 746 (W.D. Pa. 1982).
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tion for the selection procedures, the Housing Authority asserted that a
quota restricting the percentage of black families in each project was
necessary to avoid tipping and eventual resegregation.39 The court
held that the Housing Authority's plan violated the Fair Housing
Act4° because a less discriminatory tenant selection procedure could
eliminate tipping.4 1
While Starrett City was before the Second Circuit, the Sixth Circuit
approved a race-conscious tenant selection plan for a municipal hous-
ing complex. In Jaimes v. Lucas Metropolitan Housing Authority,4 2 the
court held that the Housing Authority could implement racial quotas
to foster integration and remedy prior discrimination.4 3 The Housing
Authority must terminate the plan, however, upon a finding of nondis-
criminatory integration and may not adhere so strictly to the quotas
that some people are totally deprived of the desired housing.'
Starrett City presented the Second Circuit with an opportunity to
reassess the standards it established in Otero for race-conscious tenant
selection plans. The court first concluded that the language and legis-
lative history of the Fair Housing Act offered no guidance for resolving
the conflict.4 5 The court then reviewed federal court decisions that ex-
amined the affirmative use of racial quotas.4" The court consolidated
39. Id.
40. Id. at 770. The court held that the Housing Authority's plan violated 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3604(a), (b) (1982). The Burney court initially concluded that the defendant's tenant
selection plan violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The
court then considered plaintiffs' Title VIII claims as an alternative and independent
basis for relief. 551 F. Supp. at 768.
41. Id. at 765. The court suggested that the Housing Authority establish a county-
wide waiting list and offer vacancies as they arise throughout the county. The court
noted, "The prospect of any project having a large influx of minority applicants under
such a system would be minimal." Id.
42. 833 F.2d 1203 (6th Cir. 1987). The plaintiffs, low-income minorities, brought a
class action against the Authority under the Fair Housing Act. They claimed the Au-
thority had intentionally placed public housing in minority areas. The district court
ordered injunctive and other equitable relief. The court also ordered prompt submission
of a plan to remedy internal segregation at the projects. The Housing Authority chal-
lenged the validity of the plan on appeal before the circuit court. Id. at 1205.
43. Id. at 1207. The court stated, "Here we must assume the Lucas Metropolitan
Housing Authority was guilty of past discrimination and of acts perpetuating segrega-
tion within the housing units." Id
44. Id
45. United States v. Starrett City Assoc., 840 F.2d 1096, 1101 (2d Cir. 1988).
46. Id. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency of Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616
(1987); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166 (1987); Sheet Metal Workers v.
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the limitations these cases imposed upon affirmative action plans to
produce a three-prong test for determining the validity of race-con-
scious tenant selection procedures.47 First, the court concluded that
any race-conscious plan must be temporary.48 Second, the court held
that racial quotas are valid only if they remedy prior discrimination.49
Finally, the court prohibited strict racial quotas that completely deny
minority access to low-income housing."
Applying this three-prong test, the court determined that Starrett
City's race-conscious tenant selection procedure violated the Fair
Housing Act.51 Starrett failed the first prong because Starrett pre-
dicted that the quotas, which had been in effect for ten years, would be
necessary for at least fifteen more years. Starrett failed the second
prong because its avowed purpose for quotas was to maintain its initial
goal of integration, not remedy prior discrimination. Starrett failed the
third prong because the quotas acted as a ceiling on minority access
that precluded some minority group members from obtaining
housing.52
In dissent, Judge Newman argued that Congress did not intend the
Fair Housing Act to bar the maintenance of integration, even if the
integration policy resulted in violations of the Act's antidiscrimination
provisions.53 He maintained that Otero established the validity of race-
conscious rental policies adopted to promote integration.5 4 Further-
more, the dissent claimed the court should allow the defendant an op-
portunity to show that the rental policy is necessary to prevent
EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986);
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 489 (1980); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193, 208 (1979); Jaimes v. Lucas Metro. Hous. Auth., 833 F.2d 1203, 1208 (6th
Cir. 1988); Burney v. Hous. Auth., 551 F. Supp. 746 (W.D. Pa. 1982). See supra notes
27-29 for brief descriptions of these cases.
47. Starrett City, 840 F.2d at 1101-02.
48. Id at 1101. The court noted, "A plan employing racial distinctions must be
temporary in nature with a defined goal as its termination point." Id.
49. Id at 1102.
50. Id. "[M]easures designed to increase or insure minority participation ... have
generally been upheld .... However, programs designed to maintain integration by
limiting minority participation... are of doubtful validity.... ." Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. The court noted that Otero, while still valid, did not control. Unlike Star-
rett City's practices, the New York City Housing Authority in Otero implemented a
one-time measure of definite duration to remedy an existing problem. Id.
53. Id. at 1103.
54. Id at 1108.
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segregation." Faulting the majority for its affirmance of the district
court's summary judgment, the dissent contended the defendants
should receive a trial on the merits.56
Starrett City represents a new judicial approach to race-conscious
tenant selection plans. While Otero, Burney, and Jaimes initially ex-
amined the defendant's motive for implementing a race-conscious plan,
Starrett City merely asked whether the defendant's plan satisfied the
three-part test. Furthermore, by granting summary judgment, Starrett
City departed from the accepted procedure of allowing the defendant
an opportunity to assert a compelling reason for the acts that caused
the discriminatory effects."
Substantively, Starrett City's three-prong test is compatible with
traditional judicial standards employed to evaluate the validity of race-
conscious affirmative action. 8 Procedurally, by offering a formula for
evaluating tenant selection plans, Starrett City avoids the cumbersome
case-by-case analysis59 adopted in earlier cases." Furthermore, pursu-
ant to Starrett City's test, the courts can promptly intervene to block
benign discrimination where necessary.61 Because courts lack the ex-
pertise and fact-finding capabilities to determine the impact of tenant
selection plans on the community, the three-prong test correctly elimi-
nates the need for continuous judicial supervision.62
55. Id. at 1107.
56. Id. at 1108.
57. Id at 1101. Starrett City is also distinguishable because the defendants were
private landlords rather than a state or municipal housing authority. Although Starrett
was arguably a state actor, the court did not think Starrett's status was material: "Even
if Starrett were a state actor ... , the racial quotas and related practices employed at
Starrett City to maintain integration violate the antidiscrimination provisions of the
Act." Id.
58. See supra note 46 for affirmative action cases.
59. Starrett City eliminated the need for a case-by-case analysis. Failure to meet the
three-prong test implies that a less intrusive alternative to the challenged tenant selec-
tion plan is available and that the justification for the quota is not sufficiently
compelling.
60. See Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 149 (3d Cir. 1977). The
court noted, "For the present, Title VIII criteria must emerge, then, on a case-by-case
basis." Id The Rizzo court gave the district court the discretion to determine whether
the defendant had carried its burden of establishing a justification for the acts that re-
sulted in discriminatory effects. Id. See generally Comment, supra note 30.
61. See Ackerman, supra note 4, at 309.
62. Comment, supra note 3, at 877-78. The comment notes that in Gatreaux, the
"court had some difficulty in determining the 'tipping point' of mixed neighborhoods in
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The Second Circuit's three-prong test63 avoids subjective determina-
tions as to whether the threat of racial tipping is a sufficiently compel-
ling reason for racial quotas. Instead, the court's approach offers clear
guidance to housing authorities who confront the concurrent demands
of integration and antidiscrimination.
Kathleen L. Nooney
Chicago and has been subject to some criticism for having to rely upon plaintiff's brief
for an answer." Id at 878 n.45.
63. See supra text accompanying notes 47-50 for a description of the test.
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